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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the financial system reforms in the context of financial sector 
deepening, and strategy for financial sector development and inclusion in Uganda. 
Results suggest that the indicators of financial sector development are largely as 
they were in 1996 and that the actual gains from financial inclusion strategies are 
small. Evidence suggests a weak link between financial deepening and financial 
usage by firms and households. It finds the acclaimed success (by policy makers 
and stakeholders) in achieving financial inclusion somewhat exaggerated because 
their assessment relies in large part on the number of financial and mobile money 
accounts. The paper concludes that measurement of financial inclusion needs to go 
beyond looking at account numbers to understanding what is done with those 
account. It also recommends the subordination of financial inclusion policy to the 
needs of firms and households (—the type that is modelled to fit the local context) 
and more consideration of behavioural constraints in financial inclusion programmes. 
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1 Introduction  
 
Over the past ten years, governments around the world have embraced financial 
inclusion as an objective for the financial sector and as a key to achieving inclusive pro-
poor, equitable development. To this end, the G-20 agreed in 2008 to pursue a financial 
inclusion agenda, and in 2010, it established the Global Partnership for Financial 
Inclusion to carry the agenda forward. The Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI)—
founded in 2008 as a peer exchange body for regulators from developing countries—
spearheaded the Maya Declaration process through which governments announce 
specific financial inclusion commitments. As a result of these global initiatives, and the 
growing challenges of poverty and unemployment, the Uganda Government has 
pursued wide ranging financial inclusion reforms and strategies to improve financial 
depth and the use of formal financial services such as loans, savings, payment services, 
and other related services. Yet, whether these efforts have resulted in increased access 
to affordable financial services remains a contested question.  
Evidence suggests that while Uganda’s financial services (banks, capital markets, 
microfinance, corporate finance, risk sharing and insurance, etc) have expanded both in 
quantity and depth over the last two decades, finance has not been inclusive—raising 
doubts about the effectiveness of the policy reforms aimed at delivering financial 
inclusion and strategies adopted for the financial sector. This paper explores the reason 
behind this financial inclusion gap by examining past and current policies and financial 
system reforms intended to foster financial inclusion.  
It attempts to evaluate the connection between the various initiatives to promote 
financial inclusion and some of the indicators of financial inclusion—with a view to unveil 
potential ambiguities in the policy discussions or strategies and financial inclusion 
outcomes. It looks at the strategies to achieving financial inclusion, which have often 
focused on financial depth, or expansion of the financial system—driven by 
financial/technology innovation, and the dilemmas that have been encountered in the 
process. It ask whether the inclusion gap could be a result of insufficient innovation in 
the business model, inadequate use of existing and new potential channels for reaching 
the poor, or ambiguities surrounding the strategies supposed to deliver financial 
inclusion.  
  2 
In what follows, Section 2 looks at financial sector (system) reforms. Section 3 focuses on 
the strategies that have been tried over the years to foster financial inclusion and the 
ambiguities that stand on the way of the national efforts to achieve financial inclusion.  
Section 4 and 5 address the supply and demand side of financial services, and Section 6 
concludes with recommendations.  
2 Financial sector/ system reforms 
 
2.1 Reform context   
Uganda economic policy until early-1990s was inward-looking and emphasized the role 
of the state. Active government’s involvement in economic management was perceived 
to be the only way to address problem of underdevelopment and to eradicate poverty. 
Governments held a dominant share of the financial sector and used state-controlled 
financial institutions to improve financial outreach to rural areas.  Subsidised credit was 
distributed extensively under various credit schemes such as the Rural Farmers 
Scheme, under the Uganda Commercial Bank (UCB) and the Cooperative Credit 
Scheme, under the Co-operative Bank, without considering the viability of those 
extended bank branches in rural areas or the sustainability of the programmes.  
Other schemes that benefited from the extended branch network included 
"Entandikwa" Credit Scheme, which was implemented through local governments and 
NGOs; and a number of smallholder credit programmes under the Ministry of Agriculture 
such as the Agricultural Development Project (ADP), Southwest Region Agricultural 
Rehabilitation Project (SWRARP), Progressive Farmers Loan Scheme, Rehabilitation of 
Production Enterprises scheme, Smallholder Cotton Rehabilitation Project (SCRP), 
Cotton Sub-Sector Development Project (CSDP) and Livestock Services Project (LSP), 
among others.  
Yet the expectation that these programmes would provide the rural poor with easier 
access to credit often proved to be unfounded. Formal credit reached less than 15 per 
cent of the farmers. Most of these schemes were characterized by high transaction 
costs and huge loan losses making little progress towards self-sustainability.
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On seizing power in 1986, Museveni’s government spearheaded a wide-ranging 
economic recovery and reforms program that begun in 1987 under the guise of the 
so-called “Washington Consensus”. Financial sector reform was part of a wider 
reform (structural adjustment policy package), which prescribed a return to fiscal 
discipline and reorientation of public expenditures; tax reform; trade and financial 
liberalization; unified and competitive exchange rates; openness to direct foreign 
investment, privatization and minimal state intervention in the economy; 
deregulation; secure property rights; and flexible labour markets. Reforms in the 
financial sector were implemented within the framework of the Bank of Uganda Act 
of 1993 and the Financial Institutions Act amendment of 1993, which 
 Established a legal basis for the independence of Bank of Uganda, thereby 
bringing to an end, the discretion of politicians in monetizing fiscal deficits and 
also restrained fiscal dominance in credit extension to the government.  
 Conferred to Bank of Uganda, wide-ranging powers over the financial sector 
with overall responsibility for supervising financial institutions and to serve as an 
independent regulator and sole monetary authority. 
 Introduced institutional reforms including new laws and regulations governing 
the financial sector.  
 Liberalized interest and exchange rates, as well as the capital account —
removing restrictions on capital transfers and strengthening competition in the 
financial sector. 
 Scaled back government ownership in financial institutions.  
 Reduced the corporate tax rate, and allowed new financial products and 
services to emerge including legalizing foreign exchange deposits. 
 Reduced excessive prudential requirements imposed on banks (for example, it 
reduced minimum reserve requirements from 10 to 7% for time deposits and 
from 10 to 8% for savings deposits). 
 
The strengthening of the banking supervision function of Bank of Uganda and 
adoption of strict banking legislation led to the closure of several commercial banks 
(some of which were state-owned) while other insolvent banks, which managed to 
restructure their business were re-capitalized. Non-performing assets were taken 
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over by a newly established state-owned, Non-Performing Asset Recovery Trust, 
which by 2003 had recovered over 40 percent of non-performing assets  
The role of financial sector reforms in restoring macroeconomic stability is widely 
recognized, but it was also disruptive for the livelihoods of majority of people whose 
access to formal financial services were temporary or permanently interrupted by the 
closure of several commercial banks. The collapse of the Cooperative Bank in 1999 
and the sale of state-owned Uganda Commercial Bank Limited (UCBL) eroded 
public confidence in the whole financial system resulting in a low savings rate and a 
lack of financial depth. The variance between the weighted lending rates and the 
annual yield on the Treasury bill remained very high, reflecting the high risks 
involved in lending to the private sector. Credit to private sector dwindled as 
commercial banks exercise more caution in dealing with the private sector.  
By all measures, government interventions did not enhance access to financial 
services for the broad population, but benefited the politically well-connected classes 
with cheap loans, and reform did little to correct it. It became clear that reaching the 
poor and the underserved not only required financial sector reform but inclusive 
financial system reform that takes the needs of the firm and households into 
account. 
The huge gap created by the retreating state from provision of financial services 
and the closure of major banks gave rise to the emergence of new generation of 
finance, the microfinance. The microfinance entered the scene to fill the vacuum left 
by a ‘retreating state’ and purse credit-based development interventions. However, 
they operated under very difficult policy environment. While banks were regulated 
and therefore perceived as safe, microfinance did not have this seal of approval. 
They were not legally able to accept deposits unless registered as a financial 
institution.  
With increased commitment to the implementation of Poverty Eradication Action 
Plan, government came to acknowledge the important role that microfinance could 
play in alleviating poverty, and made effort to press microfinance industry to 
augment its outreach. The administration of microfinance sector into the regulatory 
regime gave rise to a third tier of financial services industry: the Micro Deposit 
Taking Institution (MDI) regulated under the MDI Act 2003. In next section, we trace 
the process that delivered the MDI framework to fully understand the reform drivers. 
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2.2 Inclusive financial system reform process   
One of the most important developments in the history of Uganda financial services 
is the extension of formal finance frontier under the Bank of Uganda regulatory 
mandate to include non-bank financial institutions—The Microfinance Deposit Taking 
Institutions through the Microfinance Deposit Taking Institutions Act 2003 (the MDI 
Act). The origin of the MDI Act can be traced to the informal discussion that began in 
1996 between different stakeholders—microfinance institutions (MFIs), policy 
makers, and Bank of Uganda (BoU)—all with somewhat differing interests and goals. 
A growing number of MFIs requested for a regulatory framework for microfinance 
that would allow them to broaden their funding base and increase their business and 
services to clients. MFIs taking compulsory savings were experiencing pressure and 
increasing demand from their customers to provide small voluntary deposit facilities. 
Undoubtedly, a number of MFIs went out of their way to take deposits from the 
public for on-lending purposes (which was illegal for them to do). At the time, 
microfinance began to appear on the political agenda as a potentially effective 
mechanism for poverty alleviation. Policy makers argued in favour of a legal 
framework for microfinance operations. They viewed such a framework as an 
enabler for a better access to credit for the poor at low-interest rates. The central 
bank—following a prudential view—also saw the importance of bringing the activities 
of a section of the microfinance industry under a legal regime. The Bank of Uganda 
was aware that the microfinance business was growing, and that some services 
provided by MFIs apparently took place in a regulatory void.  
Government took the lead in the microfinance policy debate, and discussion 
proceeded in a more formal arrangement—a committee formed for this purpose in 
1998, which later on became the microfinance forum. Some stakeholders perceived 
regulation as a way to promote MFIs and hence improve access to financial services 
for the poor, while others, saw it as a way to enable strong (financially sound) MFIs 
to mobilize deposits.  
The Bank of Uganda was reluctant at first to take on a supervisory/ regulatory role 
(involving non-bank financial institutions, which it viewed as falling outside its 
mandate), given the complexities of the issues and the lack of clarity and consensus 
on a number of issues. However, it seemed there was increasing pressure from 
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some quarters, for them to take on the project work and draw a law to license and 
regulate the MFIs. Cautious in its approach, the Bank of Uganda, tried by all means 
to balance the competing interests before coming up with a draft a law. This helped 
in two ways. First, it helped to build consensus among stakeholders on how to deal 
explicitly with the microfinance sector. Second, because this was a gray area, there 
was need, first to build internal capacity within Bank of Uganda before proceeding 
with the drafting of the law.  
The Bank began by drafting a policy statement on microfinance as an initial step 
to first clarify the guiding principles (such as the tiered approach to management of 
microfinance) and standards for microfinance regulation—which it accomplished with 
inputs of various stakeholders: government representatives, microfinance 
practitioners, and some donors. Discussions also focused on minimum capital for 
MFIs, the definition of microfinance as a “line of business (rather than a product only 
offered by a specific type of institution), and the role of SACCOs, which were not to 
be covered by microfinance legislation.  
After the policy was approved by cabinet in July 1999 as the Government Policy 
on MFI Regulation, the drafting of the MDI legislation began—based on the already 
established consensus on principles and standards—with the Bank of Uganda 
Supervision Department taking the lead in this process. Cognizance of the 
supervisory role the Bank of Uganda would assume in future (of microfinance), the 
Bank board approved the establishment of a Microfinance Unit, and placed it under 
the Non-Bank Financial Institutions Department—in recognition that microfinance is 
a nonbank financial service.  
Staff training became a top priority after the creation of the new unit—using both 
on-the-job training provided by international experts, and international microfinance 
training programs. With these trainings, the Bank was able to build high skill base in 
field of microfinance in a comparatively short time and therefore was in a position to 
lead the consultations with stakeholders on the microfinance legislation most 
effectively. The drafting of microfinance legislation for Tier III institutions (MDI Bill) 
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took into account the specific nature of the microfinance business and upheld the 
principles of the new FIA 2004 that was at the time being discussed in parliament.1  
In January 2002 the MDI Bill was complete, and tabled in Parliament, having been 
approved by the cabinet in September 2001. The microfinance forum (MFF), Bank of 
Uganda and Association of Microfinance Institutions of Uganda (AMFIU) organised 
events to sensitize Members of Parliament (MPs) on the Bill before the bill reached 
the floor of parliament for discussion (and to lobby them to support the bill). This 
meeting also served to provide a forum for interaction between MPs and 
microfinance practitioners. Debates during these events centred on the following 
issues: 
 How the new law would promote smaller MFIs, especially in rural and remote 
areas. Because MPs perceived the MDI Bill as an instrument to promote 
microfinance, one of the major concerns was the minimum capital requirement 
of 700 million Uganda shillings, which was felt to be too high to enable small 
MFIs to come under regulation of the Bank of Uganda. 
 Interest rates on microloans and terms. The MPs argued that poor people 
could not afford to pay high interest rates, and loans were too short term to 
facilitate productive investment. Some of the MPs insisted that the MDI Bill 
address these issues. 
It became clear that the law and the policy framework would not affect Tier IV 
institutions as long as those institutions abstained from mobilizing deposits from the 
public. The legislation would enable stronger MFIs to offer additional financial 
products and services. Parliament passed (with few amendments) in November 
2002, coming into force in July 2003. The still-persisting concerns of some MPs were 
addressed by the following motion:  
It is hereby resolved that the Cabinet undertakes to bring to the August House 
within six months a Bill regulating the activities of Community-Based Financial 
Institutions referred to as Tier IV in the Report of the Committee on Finance, 
                                                 
1 Members of the drafting team (task force) of the new legislation were of the view that converting MFIs into 
deposit-taking intermediaries could be achieved with lower transactions costs by amending the draft 
Financial Institutions bill rather than creating a new legislation. However, it already been determined at 
political level to have a separate law for this purpose. 
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Planning and Economic Development guaranteeing affordable interest rates and 
reasonable period of repayment to the borrowers. 
In this context, the MFF commissioned AMFIU to prepare a proposal to regulate 
MFIs not covered by the MDI Act. In March 2003, AMFIU conducted a study to 
analyze the existing legal and institutional framework for Tier IV MFIs. Discussions 
on whether to non-prudentially regulate credit-only MFIs to ensure sound business 
practices and transparency are still ongoing. 
 
Tier IV 
Government is in advanced stages of establishing a law that will pave way for the 
formation of an autonomous institution that will license, regulate and supervise Tier 4 
Microfinance Institutions. The proposed legislation, the Tier IV Microfinance 
Institutions Act, will supervise microfinance institutions that are in the category of 
Tier IV of which SACCOs and Microfinance institutions MFIs (non-MDIs) are part. 
The law will enable the application of prudential standards to microfinance 
institutions in order to safeguard the depositors’ funds. 
 
2.3 The political economy of financial reform in Uganda   
Provision of affordable financial services to the rural population in less developed 
countries has been at the core of public policies. Direct interventions in rural finance 
through special credit programs, subsidised interest and other government policies 
was widespread until the late-to early-1980s when the system was dismantled by the 
World Bank–IMF’s ‘engineered’ structural adjustment policies. For one thing, under 
increasing political competition, credit programe is being more deeply integrated into 
the national political agenda.  
If for many years credit was aimed at addressing issues central to development 
and poverty eradication, in recent years it has become tethered to a political agenda. 
Agricultural credit programs in less developed countries can be used for political 
purposes because of government-controlled supply; and concessionary interest 
rates can be used as patronage for politically influential groups, and disbursement of 
cheap money under guise of development objectives.  
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Within Uganda's political context, direct distribution of cheap money through Rural 
Farmers Scheme, the "Entandikwa" Credit Scheme, “bonna bagaggawale” 
(prosperity for all), and the current government strategy of Group Lending 
Programme for SACCOs and community savings and credit groups such as village 
savings and loan associations and nigiina groups and a few influential groups and 
individuals by the state-controlled Microfinance Support Centre Limited (MSCL) 
clearly shows the presence of political influence in credit allocation, with implications 
for financial inclusion. Having a Minister of State for Microfinance confirms the 
centrality of microfinance finance in the life of Uganda’s politics. 
In 2001, government (a presidential statement) announced that it would inject 
USD 5,000 in each of the 5,000 parishes in Uganda (US$ 25 million in total). This 
intervention created a lot of discomfort within the microfinance community, who 
argued that such cash disbursements would undermine the sector. In response, the 
key stakeholders in the Ugandan Microfinance industry represented in the 
Microfinance Forum (MFF) came up with an alternative plan titled “Expanding the 
Outreach of Sustainable Microfinance in Uganda” that focused on increasing the 
outreach using private MFIs.  
Thanks to the microfinance outreach programme (MOP), which by its timely 
response to the presidential statement, succeeded in halting government’s initial 
plan to disburse the cash. It was surprising why non-sustainable institutions would 
benefit from substantial funding.  MOP has been responsible for (i) capacity building; 
(ii) reduction of market imperfections, especially in remote rural areas; (iii) improved 
linkages and co-operation between MFIs at district level; (iv) employment of financial 
extension workers as a contact point for clients and MFIs; and (v) consolidation of 
the government credit schemes. The Microfinance Outreach Plan was implemented 
through two components: (1) The Microfinance Capacity Building Unit (MCBU) at the 
MoFPED that was supported by IFAD and the EU offered grants to rural MFIs for the 
opening of new branches, providing computers, etc.  
The MCBU together with AMFIU was also engaged in the development of a legal 
framework for Tier IV MFIs — thereby supported by GTZ. (2) The Microfinance 
Support Centre Limited (MSCL) is a public agency that initially, channelled USD 21 
million provided by the AfDB (African Development Bank) as loans at preferential 
terms to rural NGOs and SACCOs.  
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To prevent the government from directly intervening in the microfinance sector, 
the MFF elaborated the Microfinance Outreach Plan that focuses on working with 
private MFIs instead of direct government interventions. However, since its 
inscription the MOP has been a controversial initiative mainly because channelling of 
loans at preferential terms is a core element of the plan.  
In October 2003, the President directed the transfer of the microfinance unit from 
the Office of the Prime Minister to the Ministry of Finance, which became responsible 
for the overall coordination of government policies with regards to microfinance. 
Microfinance is under the direct responsibility of the Minister of State for Micro 
Finance who coordinates with other relevant Government agencies, including the 
MTTI, the BoU, the Microfinance Outreach Plan (MOP) and the Microfinance 
Support Centre Limited (MSCL) (see below).2   
Following an appeal of the President to use existing SACCOs and to found new 
ones for speeding up rural outreach, in 2006 through MSCL cheap money was 
distributed to SACCOs all over the country.  
Later in 2006 the concept “bonna bagaggawale” (prosperity for all) was mooted. It 
originated from the NRM manifesto during the election campaign and forms the 
basis for the governments new Economic Development Strategy. As part of this 
strategy, the Ugandan government was planning to increase poor people’s access to 
rural financial services through channelling financial support (capacity building grants 
and loan funds for on-lending) and technical support to SACCOs through the state-
owned Post Bank Uganda (PBU). In addition to opening 63 new district level 
branches and acting as a wholesale lender and provider of accounting and IT 
services to SACCOs, the plan proposed the passing of a new Bill to create PBU as 
an apex body for the regulation and supervision of SACCOs.  
Further, the plan proposed to set an interest rate cap on funds on lent to SACCOs 
through PBU. Cabinet approved the plan in September 2006. The intention of the 
Ugandan government is to subsume at least elements of the large microfinance 
funding programs of the World Bank/IFAD, AfDB and the EC under “bonna 
bagaggawale”.3  
                                                 
2 A chart of the government responsibilities for microfinance can be found in the Annex. 
3 The sums involved are as follows: IFAD/World Bank   $18m, AfDB   $ 21m, EU € 6.2m. Further there are 
smaller programs of German KfW and other bilateral agencies that may also be submitted to the plan.  
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The bonna baggagalawe-scheme, was officially launched by the President on 
February 20, 2007. However, donors through the MoFPED continued to press upon 
government to have in place a legal framework for licensing and supervision of 
SACCOs and Tier IV MFIs. They advocated for minimum standards and criteria for 
SACCOs for receiving the (still subsidized) loans for on-lending, putting in place the 
principle of "saving first", restricting Post Bank Uganda’s (PBU’s) role as wholesale 
lender, training for those 17 districts, where they have already branches plus the 
other 17 districts, where there are no regulated MFIs at all and a drastic downsizing 
of the whole scheme (there were conflicting figures about the size of the scheme). 
The scheme had many issues that contradicted good microfinance practices (such 
as creation of new SACCOs in 589 sub counties where no SACCOs existed by 
then). However, it seems that a number of issues that were of major concerns have 
since been resolved. But political interference into microfinance has not gone away, 
and remains a threat to development of microfinance industry in Uganda. As it 
stands, only time will tell, what the future holds for Uganda’s microfinance industry 
3 Unveiling ambiguity  
 
Financial inclusion is firmly placed on the agenda of most governments as a key 
policy priority for poverty reduction. Over the past two decades, Uganda government 
has pursued a strategy of financial inclusion (—access by enterprises and 
households to affordable and appropriate formal financial services that meet the 
needs of enterprises and households and the use of formal financial services such 
as loans, savings, payment services, and other related services) as the linchpin of its 
strategy to address the problem of unemployment and poverty and to sustain 
economic growth. These underlying policy goals resulted in initiatives, which include  
(i) measures that target financial depth (relaxing borrowing constraints) or 
expansion of the financial system, driven by policy reforms and financial 
innovation; 
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(ii) policies in favour of government direct interventions in rural finance through 
special credit programs, financial and technical support to intermediaries and 
subsidised interest; 
(iii) policies that set an interest rate cap on funds on lent to intermediaries (e.g. 
SACCOs, village association, etc) at preferential terms; 
(iv) promoting financial (technology) innovations that can bring costs down and 
broaden outreach, and by ensuring that systems are in place to protect 
consumers (i.e. policy emphasising depositor’s protection); and 
(v) promoting financial literacy and financial services data and measurement, 
and ensuring that regulatory and supervisory capacity adequately covers the 
institutions (financial providers) that provide financial solutions at the different 
levels of the financial system. 
 
For the last twenty years, policies on financial inclusion have often focused on 
financial depth as a way to improve access and use of financial services. However, 
the contribution of financial deepening in achieving financial inclusion is ambiguous.  
The view that financial deepening spurs financial service usage lacks firm 
empirical support (Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper 2012; and World Bank, 2012). While 
Ugandan financial services (banks, capital markets, microfinance, corporate finance, 
risk sharing and insurance) have expanded both in quantity and depth over the 
years, evidence suggests that finance has not been inclusive. For instance, in 2014, 
only 27.8 percent of adults in Uganda had an account with a formal financial 
institution (Otchere 2016; Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper 2012), which is a half the 
world’s average of about 50% (Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 2012), and only 15.7 
percent received a loan from a formal financial institution (Otchere 2016; Demirgüç-
Kunt and Klapper 2012).  
There is also no clear evidence that having account is positively associated with 
financial usage. Having an account per se does not guarantee usage of financial 
services; this is further supported by the records of dormant accounts in commercial 
and MDIs and accounts facing closure every day. Account holding (without 
considering its usage) is not a good indicator of financial inclusion. The premise that 
financial inclusion becomes more feasible when financial system is deeper or better 
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capitalized, with good pricing and competitiveness does not hold water. 
Implementation ambiguity thus mirrors policy ambiguity. 
Direct government involvement in an effort to increase (rural) outreach disregards 
behavioural constraints on financial inclusion, which have undermined past efforts to 
deliver financial inclusion. If for many years financial policy was aimed at addressing 
issues central to development and poverty eradication, in more recent years it has 
become tethered to political goals and interest. It seems that most lessons learnt on 
past credit programmes have been forgotten. When you have cheap money being 
thrown around through bonna baggagalawe-scheme and now, probably, indefinitely 
with billion of shillings flowing to SACCOs and groups, there is a clear mismatch in 
expectations from what policy makers actually think they should be able to get from 
the outreach drive by playing double standards (distributing cheap money with one 
hand and regulating activities of the industry with another hand. Further, some state-
owned commercial banks (such as UCBL) failed due to government action 
undermining their solvency.  
The premise that financial intermediation for the poor cannot achieve scale 
because the regulatory framework does not provide space for appropriate (savings-
based) business models is unfounded. Inability to mobilise savings is not because of 
availability of space for appropriate business model or lack of it, but because the 
savings enablers that are needed for actors to be able to deliver savings-oriented 
inclusive financial services are not available. We instead are faced with disabler 
such as withholding tax on interest income and persistently high inflation that 
discourage financial savings.  
There is also a growing debate about the ambiguity surrounding the actual impact 
that mobile money transfer service and other financial innovations have had on 
households, firms and societies especially the poor (Ayoki, 2009). According to 
government statistics, the proportion of the financially excluded in Uganda fell from 
30 percent in 2009 to 15 percent in 2013, largely driven by the phenomenal increase 
in the usage of mobile money services (Republic of Uganda, 2014). It suggests that, 
mobile banking – a service that allows customers to operate their accounts through 
their mobile devices – has increased significantly with the increasing number of 
mobile phone users. The number of registered users of mobile money financial 
  14 
services rose to 14.24 million people as at December 2013 (Republic of Uganda, 
2014).  
While these developments cannot discounted, evidence suggest that it is not 
simply having a mobile money account, availability of mobile money services, 
holding an account at a financial institution or expanding services outreach that 
matters, but also what you do with that account (Ayoki, 2009). In the case of credit, 
financial innovation in risk sharing mechanisms and payments systems that fosters 
insurability and bankability of the poor and small actors such as smallholder farmers 
must be considered (Ayoki, 2009). 
Some authors e.g. (Ayoki, 2009) question the ability of mobile money service 
providers such as Airtel Money, MTN Mobile Money, M-PESA and others to deliver 
financial inclusion through access to poor people; especially how this can be 
achieved in a business model...” The combined cost of sending and withdrawing 
Shs300,000 through Airtel is Shs7,000, which is more than a return fare on public 
transport, from Entebbe to Kampala. Can mobile money provide affordable finance 
to the poor? As the Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman aptly notes, “it is hard to think of 
any major recent financial innovations that actually aided society” (The New York 
Times, 2009 cited by Mention and Torkkeli, 2014 and Ayoki, 2009). Critics argue that 
recent financial innovations were not aiming at the “enhancement of the ability of the 
financial sector to perform its social function” (Joseph Stiglitz, cited by The 
Economist, February 2012 and Ayoki, 2009), but rather embraced “opaque pricing 
including billing tricks and traps … that encourages unsafe lending practices” (Pew 
Charitable Trusts, 2009, cited by Lerner and Tufano, 2011 and Ayoki, 2009). Volcker 
(New York Post, December 13, 2009 cited by Ayoki, 2009) also stated that ATM was 
the only financial innovation he can think of that has improved society.   
Policy makers have maintained a narrow view of the savings dynamics and how 
to promote savings culture and investment. The passion for financial savings and 
technology innovation has overshadowed alternative traditional systems such as 
saving in livestock or other forms of assets. The failure to achieve financial inclusion 
in certain communities reminds us of the importance of knowing and understanding 
firms and households’ needs in designing and delivering innovations—the type that 
are modelled to fit the local context. After all, what is truly inclusive about diverting 
people away from their less costly traditional system of holding savings in assets e.g. 
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cattle, which earn them higher return to a non-interest or low return yielding, more 
costly savings account in financial institution?   
The idea that introducing a tiered regulatory framework for deposit-taking 
institutions would trigger significant growth of pro-poor access to finance through 
appropriate business models has some merit. After the transformation of four 
Ugandan NGOs into MDIs in 2004, there was a strong growth on the supply side 
(17% growth in number of borrowers in 2005) with a significant increase in the 
number of small loans below USD 110. The MDI’s outstanding loan portfolio 
between 2004 and 2006 rose by 25.9%. On the demand side, there was a significant 
growth of savings accounts with 41% in 2005, which shows that the poor have a 
strong demand for accessible and safe savings facilities. Total deposits at MDIs rose 
from USh 11.7 billion in 2004 to 23.230 billion in December 2006 (98% increase). 
What remains a challenge is how to get financial service providers at different 
levels of the financial system to provide affordable financial services or funding in a 
manner that is consistent with inclusive business model. Apart from high cost of 
services (e.g. credit), evidence suggests that scale of financial intermediation is 
constrained by high regulatory compliance cost. All the MDIs maintained unimpaired 
paid-up capital above the statutory capital requirements of Shs. 500 million and 
complied with the minimum core capital-to-risk-weighted-assets ratio requirement of 
15 percent. MDIs’ paid up capital increased by 1.6 percent; from Shs. 13.4 billion to 
Shs. 13.6 billion between June 2013 and March 2014. All MDIs complied with the 
statutory liquidity requirements during FY2013/14. The regulatory compliance means 
that if you have to reserve Shs500 million and another 15% in deposit insurance plus 
the liquidity requirements, those additional costs are passed through in how MDIs 
set interest rates for loans. 
4 Supply of financial services  
4.1 Account penetration 
Figure 1 shows the wide disparity in account penetration across African countries, 
with adult population having an account in formal financial institution ranging from 82 
percent in Mauritius to 7 percent in Burundi. The financial inclusion gaps mirror 
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country-specific financial frictions, which have a differential impact across countries. 
The challenge is to provide a correct diagnosis of those problems, and the 
prescriptions to alleviate them.  
 
Figure 1. Account penetration across Africa countries, 2011 and 2014 
 
 
Source: Global Findex, 2011 and 2014 
 
4.2 Mobile account penetration  
Figure 2 also shows enormous variation in the share of population with mobile 
money accounts across Africa, ranging from about 60 percent in Kenya to less than 
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0.5 percent in Ethiopia. Uganda, Tanzania, and Somalia have a population share 
with mobile money accounts of more than 30%. On the other extreme, there are 
many African countries e.g. Ethiopia, where mobile money accounts have extremely 
low outreach. 
 
Figure 2. Mobile money account penetration across countries in Africa, 2014 
 
 
Source: Otchere (2016) based on data from Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper (2012) 
 
 
4.3 Financial (supply) system in Uganda  
The Financial Institutions Act (FIA) 2004 introduced a tiered approach to the 
regulation of financial services and in the development of inclusive financial systems 
where different types of financial institutions can tailor their services to the needs of 
poor clients. The tiered approach to the regulation of microfinance services that was 
adopted in the policy statement of the Bank of Uganda in July 1999 (Bank of 
Uganda, 1999) classifies institutions that provide microfinance services into four 
categories or tiers, namely: 
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 Tier I:  Commercial banks with a fully fledged banking license. A few 
commercial banks are engaged in microfinance, notably Centenary Rural 
Development Bank Ltd (CERUDEB); 
 Tier II: Credit institutions. There is only one institution under this category i.e. 
Commercial Microfinance Ltd (CMFL) that is currently involved in microfinance 
services; 
 Tier III: Microfinance deposit-taking institutions (MDIs);  
 Tier IV: All other – MFIs, including NGOs, savings and credit cooperatives 
(SACCOs), financial services associations (FSAs) and other community-based 
organisations whose core activity is to provide financial services to their 
members. 
While Tier I and II classified institutions are regulated under the Financial Institutions 
Act (FIA) 2004; Tier III institutions are regulated under the Micro Deposit Taking 
Institution Act 2003. Institutions under Tiers I, II and III (formal financial sector) are 
supervised by the Bank of Uganda (BoU) (see Figure 1). However, the institutions 
under Tier IV (informal financial sector) are neither regulated by law nor supervised 
by the BoU. 
  
4.4 The banking sector and credit institutions (Tier I & II) 
In contrast to commercial banks (Tier I), credit institutions (Tier II) can take deposits 
and give loans but are restrained from FOREX operations. The credit institutions 
operate almost exclusively in Kampala, with the exception of PostBank Uganda Ltd 
(PBU), which offers savings and credit services up-country and has 21 branches.4 
Commercial Micro-finance Ltd provides microfinance services through six branches 
focusing on urban areas. The Microfinance Deposit-Taking Institution Act of 2003 
allows MDIs to mobilise (and lend out) deposits – under the supervision of the BoU. 
The MDI Act incorporates most key principles of modern banking supervision, while 
taking into account the specific and unique features of MFIs. So far, four Ugandan 
MFIs have been licensed as MDIs. 
                                                 
4 Until November 2005 when BoU granted a license for lending operations, PBU was a savings-only institution. 
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Uganda’s financial services industry remains dominated by the banking sector. In 
March 2007, Uganda’s banking sector consisted of 15 commercial banks, 12 of 
which are foreign-owned. The number has since grown to 24 (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Registered Commercial Banks as of March 2007 and 2017 
 
 Licensed Commercial Banks as at March 31, 2007  Licensed Commercial Banks as at  
 Name of Bank Ownership 
Number of 
branches 
 
March 31, 2017 
1 Bank of Africa (Fr. Allied Bank Intl) Foreign 5 ABC Capital Bank Limited 
2 Bank of Baroda (U) Ltd Foreign 6 Barclays Bank of Uganda Limited 
3 Barclays Bank (U) Ltd Foreign 8 Bank of Baroda 
4 Cairo Bank Foreign 1 Bank of Africa Uganda Ltd 
5 Centenary Rural Dev. Bank  Local 25 Bank of India (Uganda) Ltd 
6 Citi Bank Foreign 1 Cairo International Bank Ltd 
7 Crane Bank Local 15 Commercial Bank of Africa (Uganda)  
8 Diamond Trust Bank Foreign 1 Centenary Rural Development Bank 
9 DFCU Bank Foreign 7 Citibank Uganda Ltd 
10 National Bank of Commerce Foreign 2 DFCU Bank 
11 Nile Bank Ltd Foreign 7 Diamond Trust Bank Uganda 
12 Orient Bank Ltd. Local 7 Ecobank Uganda Limited 
13 Stanbic Bank Foreign 63 Equity Bank Uganda Ltd 
14 Standard Chartered Bank Foreign 6 Exim Bank (Uganda) Ltd 
15 Tropical Bank Foreign 3 Finance Trust Bank Ltd 
16    Guaranty Trust Bank (Uganda) 
17    Housing Finance Bank Ltd 
18    KCB Bank Uganda Limited 
19    NC Bank Uganda Limited 
20    Orient Bank Ltd 
21    Stanbic Bank Uganda Ltd 
22    Standard Chartered Bank Uganda 
23    Tropical Bank Ltd 
24    United Bank for Africa Uganda Ltd 
     
 
In 2005, foreign-owned banks together held 84% of total assets, with the two biggest 
banks, Stanbic Bank and Standard Chartered, holding a market share of about 52% 
and 55%, of total assets and total deposits respectively (www.bou.or.ug). 
Having acquired the formerly state-owned Uganda Commercial Bank Limited 
(UCBL) in 2002, Stanbic Bank is the largest bank in Uganda and with 63 branches 
holds the largest branch network in the country. Stanbic Bank is a subsidiary of the 
Standard Bank Group, one of Africa’s leading banking and financial services groups. 
Following the acquisition of UCBL, Stanbic’s strategy shifted from providing basically 
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corporate banking to that of providing a wide range of wholesale and retail banking 
products and services. In terms of its branch network, CERUDEB that is owned by 
the local Catholic Church is the second bank with 25 outlets nationwide. DFCU 
(Development Finance Corporation Uganda) which is the market leader in leasing 
has a particular potential to serve small enterprises. Besides 7 commercial banking 
branches of DFCU Bank, DFCU-Leasing has 5 branches located in Kampala and 4 
in other towns. The rest of the banks with the exception of Crane Bank have six or 
fewer branches with a high concentration in Kampala.  
In addition to the commercial banks, there are 4 credit institutions (from 7 in 2007) 
licensed by BoU, all locally owned (one owned by the government). In contrast to 
commercial banks credit Institutions can take deposits and give loans but are 
restrained from FOREX operations. The credit institutions operate almost exclusively 
in Kampala, with the exception of PostBank Uganda Ltd. (PBU), which offers savings 
and credit services up-country and has 21 branches.5 CMFL provides microfinance 
services through 6 branches focusing on urban areas. 
  
Table 2. Registered credit institutions as at 31/12/2006 
 
Licensed credit institutions as at March 31, 
2006 
Ownership 
Number of 
Branches 
Licensed credit institutions as 
at March 31, 2017 
1. Housing Finance Company (U) Ltd Local 2 Mercantile Credit Bank  
2. Commercial Micro Finance Ltd. (CMFL) Local 6 PostBank Uganda Ltd 
3. Mercantile Finance Co.Ltd Local 1 Opportunity Bank Uganda Ltd 
4. Capital Finance Corporation Ltd. Local 2 Top Finance Bank Uganda Ltd 
5. Stanhope Finance Co. Ltd. Local 0  
6. Imperial Investments Finance Co.Ltd. Local 0  
7. PostBank Uganda (PBU) Local  21  
   Total    32  
 
Although there are only one commercial bank and one credit institution that 
specialize in microlending on the retail level, some of the banks have started to 
experiment with technology innovations to explore the “mass savings market”. On 
the lending side, most commercial banks in the near future will abstain from directly 
serving poorer clients. Some of them have, however, started to lend to top MFIs, 
especially those that are regulated under the MDI Act.  
                                                 
5  Until November 2005 when BoU granted a license for lending operations PBU was a savings-only institution. 
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In addition to commercial banks and credit institutions the formal financial sector 
comprises over 80 FOREX bureaus, 20 insurance companies, and 4 licensed 
Microfinance Deposit-taking Institutions (MDIs) described below.  
There were about 219 formal service outlets in the country in 2007, comprising all 
the branches of commercial banks, credit institutions and MDIs combined. With 75 
districts in the country, there are, on average, two formal finance outlets per district 
serving a population of about a half million people.  
Uganda’s financial system is still very shallow. The government has a target to 
increase in financial depth (measured by M3/GDP) from the current level of about 20 
per cent to 29 per cent of GDP by 2013/14. Savings are picking up, but the volume 
of private sector credit is still very low compared to neighbouring countries (see 
Table 3). Agricultural finance is almost non-existent, and rural outreach of financial 
services is weak. Only a small proportion of the population has access to formal 
financial services. The majority of the poor has no savings accounts, does not have 
access to loans from formal financial institutions and has no insurance policies. 
Instead, many rely on informal services – ranging from the most traditional (saving in 
boxes at home) to a cooperative system (see Table 3). 
  
 
Table 3. Financial intermediation across countries, 2003 
(percent) 
  Country 
Private 
Credit/GDP 
Bank 
Deposits/GDP 
Loan/Deposit 
Ratio 
Overhead 
Costs 
    
 
(1) Uganda 7.0 19.6 42.1 7.9 
(2) Tanzania 6.8 22.2 40.9 7.0 
(3) Kenya 22.6 42.9 60.1 6.1 
(4) Sub-Saharan Africa 19.1 31.3 74.2 6.1 
(5) Low-Income Countries  15.0 30.7 70.0 5.9 
    
 
Source: Terberger, 2006. 
 
In order to create a sound framework for the orderly development of the financial 
sector, the Government has strived to strengthen the regulatory and supervisory 
responsibilities of BoU with the enactment of a new FIA in April 2004. The FIA 2004 
incorporates most key features of modern banking legislation, including an extensive 
focus on corporate governance issues, provisions for prompt corrective action and 
improved transparency and disclosure. 
  22 
The Capital Market Authority (CMA) was established in 1996 and charged with 
promoting and developing an orderly, fair, and efficient capital market. The market is 
supported by a well-designed law, but remains a small market with low 
capitalization.6 Given the low volume of trade liquidity the way forward is for both 
investors and listed firms in Uganda to have access to more developed markets that 
offer superior infrastructure, liquidity and depth. The investments already made 
toward regional integration and the establishment of the East African Regional Stock 
Exchange will allow partner governments to enhance the efficiency and liquidity of 
the regional market. But this will be fully realised when a functioning regional 
exchange in the EAC (East African Community) is created (The World Bank, 2007). 
The limited market for bonds has hindered further developments in the corporate 
bond market. Today, there are only five corporate bond issues.  
 
4.5 The microfinance sector (Tier III & IV) 
 
4.5.1 Overview  
Microfinance can be offered by a wide range of institutions ranging from formal 
(institutions licensed and prudentially supervised by the country’s banking 
authorities, e.g. banks and licensed non-bank financial institutions) to semi-formal 
(registered with and officially recognized by some public authority but not 
prudentially supervised by the banking authorities) to informal (not registered with or 
officially recognized by any government authority).  
Uganda experienced a proliferation of microfinance institutions (MFIs) during the 
1990s. In 1990, it was estimated that MFIs were providing loans to an estimated 
50,000 clients. In 2005, a survey undertaken by DFID Financial Sector Deepening 
Project established that a total of 801,813 clients were served by MFIs. Given that 
the clients of these institutions are typically very poor women with no collateral and 
that legal enforcement of these loans is almost impossible, Ugandan MFIs typically 
                                                 
6  Currently there are nine listings on the Uganda Securities Exchange: The local listings include Stanbic Bank, 
Uganda Clays Limited, British American Tobacco Limited, Bank of Baroda Uganda, DFCU Group and New 
Vision Printing and Publishing Limited. The cross-border listed companies are East African Breweries, 
Kenya Airways and Jubilee Holdings Limited. 
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employ a lending technology based on joint-liability groups combined with 
compulsory savings to ensure timely repayment. A number of the larger MFIs (and 
all MDIs) also now offer individual loans. 
Aggregate data on microfinance are scanty and unreliable. However, recent 
studies indicate that very small percentage of the Ugandan population (0.9 per cent) 
is utilising microfinance services. This ratio represents only 2.4 per cent of the 
population estimated to be living below the poverty line (Ayoki, 2006).  
 
Table 4. MFI outreach: Top countries (credit clients as a percentage of population) 
 Country %  Country %   
 Bangladesh 13.1  Senegal 1.6   
  Indonesia 6.7  Nepal  1.5   
 Thailand 6.5  Mali 1.5   
 Sri Lanka 4.3  Niger 1.4   
 Vietnam 4.3  Honduras 1.2   
 Cambodia 3.0  El Salvador 1.2   
 Malawi 2.6  Nicaragua 1.1   
 Togo 2.4  India 1.1   
 Gambia, The 1.7  Bolivia 1.1   
 Benin 1.7  Ethiopia 0.9   
            
 
Source: Based on Daley-Harris, 2003. 
 
The current trend is reflected in the heavy concentration of MFIs in and around 
Kampala and a few major towns with limited geographical outreach – what some 
people refer to as the 'Kampala–Mbarara microfinance highway'. High operational 
costs experienced by MFIs and the influence of high treasury bill interest rates have 
made these MFIs maintain high interest rates on loans, ranging from 22–48 per cent 
per annum and 2–5 per cent per month.  
 
4.5.2 Tier III: Micro Deposit-Taking Institutions  
As mentioned early already, the class of tier III financial institutions was created 
under the Microfinance Deposit-Taking Act (MDI Act) in 2003. The MDI Act allows 
sound and sustainable MFIs to mobilize deposits and thus are under the supervisory 
arm of the Bank of Uganda. The MDI Act incorporates most key principles of modern 
banking supervision and at the same time it takes into account the specific and 
unique features of MFIs. By 2006, four Ugandan MFIs have been licensed as MDIs: 
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FINCA Uganda, Pride Microfinance Limited (PML), Uganda Microfinance Limited 
(UML), and Uganda Finance Trust (U-Trust).   
 
FINCA Uganda (FU) 
At the time of licensing in November 2004, FU had over 48,000 clients and a 
portfolio of 10.5 billion Uganda shillings (about US$5.8 million), making it the second 
largest MFI by clients and third by portfolio. By December 2005, FU had a total of 
46,267 active borrowers and 20,947 savings clients with an outstanding loan 
portfolio of Ush 11.4 billion. As Ugandan affiliate of FINCA International (FI), FU’s 
strategy and management are largely influenced by the head office in Washington, 
DC. One of FI’s main aspirations in transforming FU was that the company remains 
under its control. The MDI Act limits ownership by any one person to 30 percent. The 
law does, however, allow an exemption in the case of a reputable financial 
institution. FI was able to demonstrate to the Bank of Uganda that it met this 
requirement, and accordingly the license was granted with FI effectively owning 100 
percent of the shares of FU. FI undertook initial steps to reduce its ownership over a 
five-year period. 
As of December 2015, FU’s asset base stood at Ush128.51 billion, with 
shareholders' equity of Ush 42.67 billion. It operates 27 inter-linked branches 
nationwide (as of March 2015).  In Tanzania, 43% of FINCA transactions occur on 
mobile phones. 
 
Pride Microfinance Limited (PML) 
PRIDE Uganda began as a Ugandan government project with funding from the 
bilateral Norwegian Aid. In 2002, PRIDE acquired an NGO status, and assumed all 
of the project’s assets and liabilities. Then, in 2004, in anticipation of transformation, 
a share company called Pride Microfinance Ltd (PML), majority-owned by the NGO 
but with additional investors, was formed and the assets and liabilities of the NGO 
transferred to it. However, prior to licensing, questions were raised by both 
stakeholders and government as to the procedures followed in the creation of PML, 
and ultimately the full ownership of the company reverted to the government of 
Uganda. The question of ownership of PML was resolved, at least on an interim 
basis. At the time of its licensing in June 2005, PML had 51,500 clients and 18.4 
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billion Uganda Shillings (US$10.2 billion) in portfolio, ranking first in clients and 
second in portfolio. By 31 December 2005, the number had grown to 69,314 active 
borrowers and 21,822 savings clients, with outstanding loan portfolio of USh 20.37 
billion. 
 
Uganda Microfinance Limited (UML)  
At the time of acquiring MDI license in June 2005, UML was the largest MFI in the 
country by portfolio (20.7 billion Uganda shillings, or US$11.5 million) and the third 
largest by borrowers (35,000). By 31 December 2005, UML’s number of active 
borrowers had decreased to 30,738 though the outstanding loan portfolio remained 
stable at USh 20.35 billion. UML made remarkable progress in growing the number 
of savings accounts, with 81,027 depositors by 31 December 2005. The UML was 
previously as an NGO known as Uganda Microfinance Union (UMU) – created in 
1997 – until it acquired an MDI license in 2005, transforming itself into Uganda 
Microfinance Limited (UML), a microfinance deposit taking institution regulated by 
Bank of Uganda. UML from the very beginning had a clear strategic vision to provide 
a broad range microfinance services to the poor on a sustainable basis. With this 
vision UML was one of the lead supporters of the project to introduce a new 
microfinance legislation to enable strong institutions to mobilize savings. Before its 
acquisition in April 2008, UML offered a broad range of credit and savings products 
including loans for salaried employees, home improvement loans, etc. In April 2008, 
Equity Bank Kenya Limited successfully acquired Uganda Microfinance Limited 
(UML).  
  
Uganda Finance Trust (U-Trust)  
Although its parent Uganda Women’s Finance Trust was the oldest MFI in Uganda, 
U-Trust was the last of the four MDIs to acquire MDI license in October 2005. Its 
portfolio of 12.2 billion Uganda shillings (US$6.8 million) ranked third among the 
four, and its borrower base of 20,100 ranked fourth. However, UWFT had been 
actively mobilizing savings deposits from the public for years, accumulating 4.4 
billion Uganda shillings in savings from 72,000 depositors, far more than its 
competitors. By 31 December 2005, the number of depositors had grown to 78,707, 
with 17,052 active borrowers.  
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On 11th November 2013, Finance Trust Bank was granted a commercial banking 
licence as a Tier 1 Financial institution, taking over the business of Uganda Finance 
Trust Limited (MDI). Over time, new MDIs have been licensed (Table 5) 
 
   
Table 5.  List of Microfinance Deposit Taking Institutions in Uganda, December 2017 
 
  MDIs Date granted MDI License 
(1) Entrepreneurs Financial Centre (EFC) Uganda Limited 17th November, 2014 
(2) FINCA Uganda Limited  November 2004 
(3) Pride Microfinance Limited  June 2005 
(4) UGAFODE Microfinance Limited October 2011  
(5) YAKO Microfinance Limited September 2015 
  Source: Goto (1989) based on United Nations trade statistics. 
 
Outreach indicators of MDIs 
Table 6 summarizes selected outreach indicators of MDIs. In 2005 there has been a 
strong growth on the lending side. More impressive however is the growth of savings 
accounts with 41% in 2005 which indicates that the poor have a strong demand for 
accessible and safe savings facilities. Women take the lion’s share of smaller loans 
and have a much stronger demand for savings services than men. In March 2007, 
8252 cooperative societies had been registered with the Registrar of Co-operatives, 
2800 of which are SACCOs. Another 1263 cooperatives are on probation – awaiting 
registration. Of the 2800 SACCOs, 172 are being mentored by Uganda Cooperative 
Alliance (UCA).  
 
Table 6. Selected indicators of MDI outreach 
 
 Total Women Change Growth 
Credit      
No. of loan clients, 31st Dec 2005* 145,120  55.6%  + 17% 
No. of loans < 200,000  (USD 110 ) Jan -Dec 2005 65,773  64% + 12% 
No. of loans  >3,000,000 (USD 1700)  Jan-Dec 2005 1,568 38.3% - 8.5% 
Active loan clients chin rural branches by Dec 2005 100,902   - 13% 
Av. disbursed loan amount, Jan-Dec 05 667,318   + 13% 
Savings      
No of clients with savings, Jan- Dec 2005 248932 70%+ + 41% 
Av. amount per savings, Dec 2005 120,031 116,735   
* 77% of clients received loans as members of groups     
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4.5.3 Tier IV sector  
SACCOs  
For over 20 years, the cooperative movement in Uganda has been neglected by 
government and donor agencies because of mismanagement and political influence. 
Over a decade after the collapse of cooperatives, government thought of reviving 
cooperatives. A high-level task force (chaired by the deputy speaker of parliament) 
was created to spearhead the revival of cooperatives, particularly SACCOs. Even 
then, the government strategy has been too focused on increasing the number of 
SACCOs without sufficiently taking into account the demand side and the capacity of 
these institutions. 
The most serious problems in the sector are weak management and leadership, 
fraud, insider lending, poor financial performance, and improper record keeping. 
There is not a strong sense of ownership and leadership tends to change too often. 
In addition, some of the District Co-operative Officers, which are responsible for the 
reporting to the Commissioner’s Office, suffer from conflicts of interest as they at the 
same time supervise SACCOs and assist with the bookkeeping. They lack strong 
incentives to regularly report to the Cooperative Department in the Ministry of 
Tourism, Trade and Industry (MTTI) that is in charge of the cooperatives.  
Some SACCOs have a strong growth potential which entails certain risks. 
International experience shows that large institutions with more than 10,000 
members can no longer be effectively controlled by their members. Thus the need 
for prudential regulation by a specialized financial regulator becomes much more 
acute. The Co-operative Department in MTTI presumably cannot fulfill this role in its 
current capacity. Still, despite the weaknesses of the sector, the government, 
especially the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Development (MoFPED) expect 
these institutions to play an important role in the development of the rural financial 
sector – an issue that will be taken up later in the report. 
 
NGO-type MFIs 
The majority of these institutions are registered both as NGOs and as companies 
limited by guarantee. Most NGOs receive considerable support from donors and 
serve clients with fairly short-term loans with group guarantees and frequent 
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payment schedules. The interest rates and fees charged for small loans amounts to 
36–80 per cent nominal annual effective interest rate, which in part is needed to 
cover high operating expenses. The number of Tier IV MFIs other than SACCOs is 
not exactly known, as neither the NGO Board nor the Registrar of Companies keeps 
separate records of institutions offering financial services to the poor.  
Well-performing NGOs have a chance to access bank loans. These wholesale 
relationships permit banks to utilise their comparative advantage in mobilising 
savings, whereas the NGOs utilise their comparative advantage of making small 
loans with non-traditional collateral. Unfortunately, most of these institutions are 
assumed to be quite weak, only about a dozen is recognised as having potential to 
become important players in the financial market and eventually transform to micro-
deposit-taking institutions in the future. 
 
Moneylenders and money keepers 
Moneylenders are quite different from the other Tier IV institutions as they are not 
incorporated, but mainly individuals lending money from their own sources and on 
their own account. Moneylenders can be found at all social levels, from the remote 
rural village to the parliament’s floor. Legally, they operate under the Moneylenders 
Act 1952, but since there is no central registry for moneylenders, the exact size of 
the sector is unknown.  
To reduce the risk of theft, or to be able to deny claims from family members, 
relatives and friends, many people use (business) people, whom they trust to keep 
money for them. In most cases, there is no documentation – no receipt or signature 
as proof of deposits. The deposits earn no interest and can be withdrawn at short 
notice. The money keepers maintain enough liquidity to service the claims of their 
depositors, but they may use the funds to finance their own business transactions or 
for lending.  
 
CBOs7  
There are other CBOs engaged in the microfinance business, which are or are not 
registered at district level. Exact numbers are hard to know, but it is estimated that 
                                                 
7Sometimes these are called SIDAs (sub-county integrated development associations). 
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there are more than 10,000 of these organisations are scattered across the country. 
There are different forms of organisations such as community-based village banks, 
FSAs,8 and savings and loan associations (SLAs).9 Some of these organisations are 
savings-based self-help groups but often they are created with the expectation of 
receiving external assistance. 
 
Informal self-help groups/associations 
Informal groups (‘self-help’ as they are sometimes called) are mechanisms to cope 
with daily problems in the community. ROSCAs and accumulating savings and credit 
association (ASCAs or non-ROSCAs) are good examples. They have been in 
existence for centuries. Prior to the monetisation of the rural economy, workplace 
and social associations dominated. Today, ROSCAs and ASCAs frequently offer 
assistance in savings and credit services. Some groups perform additional functions, 
such as the provision of basic health and accident insurance and emergency aid 
through mutual aid mechanisms.  
 
Traditional systems  
 
Traditional systems include saving money in wooden or metallic boxes at home, or in 
a belt made of cloth material tied around the waist (called ekitamba in Luganda, 
omweko-omushumi in Lukiga and alid in Luo – used especially by elderly women), or 
keeping money under the mattress, among other methods. This system also 
comprises holding financial savings in form of livestock and poultry. 
 
Legal frameworks for financial service providers in tier IV  
Table 7 shows the legislations applying to financial providers in tier IV. The law 
empowers Bank of Uganda to investigate such cases and to close down institutions 
doing banking business without holding a license. Yet it does neither have the 
capacity nor the necessary physical proximity to know about such illegal activities 
and to initiate the adequate investigations. Bank of Uganda typically sees its role as 
                                                 
8  FSAs are small locally managed MFIs that provide savings and loan services to their shareholders. The model was 
developed by Ahmad Jazayeri in Uganda and Tanzania as a means to provide financial services to low-income 
people. In 2003, FSAs in Southern Uganda had around 13,000 members.  
9  CARE has created around 600 SLAs, with around 13,000 members in the Western Nile region.  
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that primarily concerned with the regulation and supervision of banks, credit 
institutions and MDIs. Closely related to this is the current trend of new MFIs 
mushrooming all over the country. There are some indications that the growth rate of 
the sector is huge. The danger is that this high growth can only be achieved by 
compromising on soundness and professionalism of new institutions. 
 
Table 7. Legal Frameworks for Financial Service Providers in Tier IV 
 
Name of Parent 
Act 
Co-operative Societies 
Statute, 1991 and Co-
operative (Amendment) 
Bill, 2002 
Non-Governmental 
Organizations 
Registration Statute, 
1989 
Companies Act, 
1961 
Money-Lenders Act, 
1952 
Secondary 
Legislation 
None Non-Governmental 
Organizations 
Regulations, 1990 
None The Money-Lenders 
(Licenses and 
Certificates) Rules 
Responsible 
Ministry 
Ministry of Tourism, 
Trade and Industry 
Ministry of Internal 
Affairs 
Ministry of Justice To our knowledge: 
Ministry of Finance, 
Planning and Economic 
Development 
Licensing Authority Registrar of Co-
operatives / 
Commissioner 
NGO Board Registrar of 
Companies 
Chief Magistrates 
Associations / 
Networks 
Uganda Co-operative 
Alliance (UCA) and 
Uganda Co-operative 
Savings and Credit 
Union (UCSCU) 
NGO Forum; DENIVA 
(for indigenous NGOs 
None None 
MFIs falling under 
this legislation 
SACCOs Microfinance NGOs Microfinance 
NGOs and/or 
limited companies  
Individual and corporate 
bodies doing money-
lending business 
Number of MFIs around 680, of which 
maybe 300 are active 
Hundreds At least as many 
as NGOs 
Thousands 
Source: Akampurira; Staschen (2003) 
5 Demand for financial services  
 
5.1 Financing businesses  
According to the 2003 and 2016 household surveys conducted by the Uganda 
Bureau of Statistics, the first source of finance for starting a business in Uganda is 
own savings. The financial sector (SACCO, MDI, Commercial banks, and Local 
groups, all combined) account for a paltry 5 percent of overall startup capital for the 
enterprises (Table 8).  
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Table 8. Source of finance for business start-up 
(percent) 
Source  
Rural (%)  Urban  Total 
2003  2016   2003  2016  2003  2016  
Own savings  92.7 75.4  89.7   82.6 92.4 77.8 
Commercial Bank 5.3* 0.8   8.4*   1.6  5.6 1.1  
SACCO -- 1.1   -- 0.8  -- 1.0 
MDIs  -- 0.5   -- 1.0  -- 0.6  
Local Group -- 2.3  -- 0.9 -- 1.9 
Other source 1.7 3.9  -- 6.2 1.6 4.6 
I didn’t need any money -- 16.1  -- 6.9 -- 13.0 
Total  100 100   100  100  100  100  
 
Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics (2003) and 2016 
Notes:  *Include loans from friends, relatives, money lenders, banks, or other financial institutions 
Other sources include employer, landlord, NGO, Friend, Relative, credit union, Local money lender 
 
Urban enterprises and households are more likely (than their rural counterparts) to 
access loans to finance their business start-up (10.5 percent in 2016/17 up from 8.6 
percent in 2003).  In rural areas 8.6 percent of households reported to have had 
access to loans in 2016/17 (up from 5 percent in 2003). Over 50 percent of 
households interviewed in the survey report start-up capital as the major problem in 
setting up enterprises.  
 
Table 9. Major problems in setting up a business 
 
 Number % Number % Number % 
Problems  ('000) -Rural   ('000) - Urban  ('000) - Total   
None  223  14.0  18 10.8  241  13.7  
Start-up capital  819  51.3  96 57.5  915  51.9  
Obtaining skills  111  7.0  11 6.6  122  6.9  
Accessing raw materials  131  8.2  7 4.2  138  7.8  
Finding clients/ markets  175  11.0  26 15.6  201  11.4  
Government regulations  27  1.7  2 1.2  29  1.6  
Water, elect., transport  28  1.8  1 0.6  29  1.6  
Others  51  3.2  4 2.4  55  3.1  
Not stated*  31  1.9  2 1.2  33  1.9  
Total  1,596  100  167 100  1,763  100  
Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics (2003) 
*Some people stated unspecific problems. 
 
On the source of finance for expanding business, the 2016/17 UNHS (Table 9) 
indicates that more than half of the enterprises (54%) relied on own savings for 
further expansion of business enterprises, and meet unexpected expenses (Table 
10). This story is not very different from that of business start-ups, which reflects 
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natural tendency of financial institutions, including those supposed to serve the 
unbanked, to adopt a risk-adverse attitude, which adds to the common belief that 
most financial innovations are not there to deliver financial inclusion. 
  
Table 10. Source of finance for expanding business 
(percent) 
Source  
Rural (%)  Urban  Total 
2003  2016   2003  2016  2003  2016  
Own savings  -- 57.9  -- 46.3 -- 53.5 
Commercial Bank -- 3.6  -- 8.7 -- 5.6 
SACCO -- 4.8  -- 3.7 -- 4.4 
MDIs  -- 2.0  -- 10.7 -- 5.4 
Local Group -- 17.9  -- 11.7 -- 15.5 
Other source -- 13.8  -- 18.9 -- 15.7 
Total  -- 100  -- 100 -- 100 
 
Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics (2016) 
Notes:  Other sources include employer, landlord, NGO, Friend, Relative, credit union, Local money lender 
 
5.2 Selected access indicators for MDIs  
Table 11 provides data on the average loan size, the outstanding portfolio and the 
number of active borrowers and savers of the Ugandan MDIs and the largest tier IV 
institutions. There is clear indication that the MDIs serve by far larger numbers of 
clients than non-regulated institutions. 
 
Table 11. Selected Indicators of the eight Largest Ugandan MFIs (31 December 2005) 
 
MFI Tier 
Average 1st 
loan 
Current Av. 
loan size 
Outstanding 
Portfolio 
Nr of Active 
Borrowers 
Total No 
of Savers* 
FAULU Uganda Ltd. 4 590,880.00 422,803.0 6,153,904,178.0 11,909 24,813 
FINCA Uganda (MDI) Ltd 3 215,000.00 456,000.0 11,400,000,000.0 46,267 20,947 
FOCCAS Uganda 4 50,000.00 100,000.0 1,700,000,000.0 16,325 16,325 
MED-Net 4 200,000.00 350,722.0 5,894,058,562.0 22,230 22,230 
PRIDE Microfinance Ltd. 3 150,000.00 540,482.0 20,370,000,000.0 69,314 21,822 
UGAFODE Ltd. 4 200,000.00 232,484.0 2,900,000,000.0 12,817 10,121 
Uganda Finance Trust Ltd 3 375,000.00 784,339.0 13,375,000,000.0 17,052 78,707 
Uganda Microfinance Union 
Ltd 3 200,000.00 500,000.0 20,353,645,794.0 30,738 81,027 
Growth/Total   70% 82,146,608,534 226,652 275,992 
Notes: MED-Net = Micro Enterprise Development Network; UGAFODE = Uganda Agency for Development 
* Savings of most tier IV institutions are compulsory savings that are taken as collateral which is allowed for non-regulated 
institutions. Only FAULU, where the number of savers by far exceeds the number of borrowers is taking savings from non-
borrowers. FAULU, however, is on its way to transform into an MDI which will “legalize” the savings.  
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Table 11 further shows a 70% growth in the average loan size compared to the 
average first loan which indicates that many clients have been for some time with the 
institution and have become eligible for larger loans. Figure 3 indicates that the 
beginning of the process of licensing MDIs in 2004 had a strong impact on savings 
mobilisation whereas on the lending side there was little impact. 
 
  Figure 3. Policy Impact on Access 
 
 
 
 
Cost of finance 
 
The interest rates reported by commercial banks in Kampala range from 22-25 
percent per annum, compared to about 30 percent charged by credit institutions and 
over 35 percent charged by MDIs. The rates are far higher for moneylenders (72-
480% per annum).  Group loans normally seem to be more expensive than individual 
loans which may be due to the smaller loan volumes and the potential risks involved 
if no physical collateral is pledged. 
 
Collateral requirements  
Land is the preferred or even the only collateral accepted by commercial banks. 
However, most of the small borrowers and the rural poor in Uganda rarely hold the 
deeds to land. Also the rural people are sometimes reluctant to enter into self-
binding contracts, such as a loan contract, for fear of losing their livelihood assets.    
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Table 12. Interest rates and other charges on loans 
 
Banks and non-banks 
financial service 
providers 
Interest per annum (%) Application/ 
documentation 
fee 
Commitment 
fee (% loan 
amount) 
 Insurance  
(% of total 
loan amount) 
Salary 
loans 
Group 
loans 
Individual/ 
business loans 
Commercial Banks 22-25 -- 22-25 5,000 - 25,000 2 2 
Credit Institutions 34.8 -- 30 20,000 - 50,000 - 1.2-2 
MDIs 36 48 48 30,000 - 1-2 
Other MFIs (Non-MDIs) 24 36 30 1.25% - 1 - 2 
SACCOs --  7-13   -- 
Money lenders -- -- 72 - 480 -- - -- 
Most MDIs charge interest of 4% p.m. (on outstanding loan balance) for business/group loans, credit institutions charge 
flat interest of 2.5% p.m. (on original loan amount). Some institutions e.g. Centenary Rural Development Bank and 
Uganda Micro Finance Ltd (UML) offer “Home Improvements Loan” –   at an interest of 22% p.a. (CERUDEB) to 48% 
p.a. (UML). Land is the common form of security.   
 
 
In urban areas, most credit institutions prefer vehicles to land (as a form of collateral) 
especially for small loans (< USh 10 million) since transferring ownership is easier 
for vehicles than for land. Substitutes for land and other asset collateral that are 
acceptable to MDIs and MFIs are group guarantee mechanism combined with 
compulsory savings. 
Loans granted on the basis of the client’s savings represent a certain percentage 
of the accumulated deposits, and the savings account is fully or partially blocked 
during the loan period and can only be withdrawn when the loan is fully repaid. 
  
Table 13. Types of collateral demanded by financial institutions 
 
  <1000,000 1,000,000 – 10,000,000 Above 10,000,000  
Commercial Banks Land  Land   Land  
Credit Institutions Clients Savings Vehicle 
Client’s Savings,  Vehicle 
or /and Land Client’s Savings/Land  
MDIs 
Group Guarantee, 
Client’s Savings Savings, Land  Land 
SACCOs 
Guarantor s, Client’s 
Savings 
Guarantor s (sureties), 
client’s savings, land - 
Other MFIs 
Group Guarantee, 
Client’s (Compulsory) 
Savings  Vehicle - 
Money lenders 
Vehicle  
Post Dated Check 
Vehicle  
Post Dated Check Vehicle  
 
Given the value attached to land as collateral by Ugandan financial institutions, the 
potential to enhance access to finance through the strengthening of the secured 
lending framework  remains a challenge. 
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Other costs of finance (other transaction costs)  
Apart from interest rates, a major component of transaction costs is insurance (for 
loans and collateral particularly vehicles that can only be used as a collateral if 
comprehensively insured). All transfer costs or costs associated with registering the 
security are also borne by the borrower. Commercial banks charge an application or 
commitment fee or both (Table 12). In most cases, borrowers pay for land 
verification and valuation – a cost of about USh 140,000. In some banks, a penalty 
interest of 0.55 (or more) is charged per day for late repayment on the outstanding 
loan amount  in arrears (up to a period, usually not more than 30 days). 
 
5.3 Selected trend in financial services usage, including savings  
Table 11 shows that only 8 percent of households (household enterprises) were 
using commercial banks as savings mechanisms by the time of the interview in 
2016/17, majority (33%) keep money at home/secret place (informal system) and 16 
percent save with village and loans associations (VSLAs). 
  
   
Table 14. Savings mechanism used by households in Uganda, 2016/17 
(percent) 
 
Commercial bank SACCO 
Home/secret 
place VSLA 
Mobile 
money ROSCA Othera Not saving 
 Male 8.4 3.3 32.6 15.0 10.5 4.2 7.6 6.6 
 Female 8.4 3.2 32.6 15.9 9.5 6.5 5.1 9.6 
Rural 4.9 3.0 35.5 17.8 7.8 4.8 5.9 8.3 
Urban 16.8 3.7 25.9  10.0 15.0 6.5 7.3 7.7 
   
 
 
    
Kampala 22.3 4.1 20.3 3.8 20.4 7.3 8.0 9.1 
National 8.4 3.2 32.6 15.5 10.0 5.3 6.3 8.1 
   
 
 
    
Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs). Village Savings and Loans Associations (VSLAs), Rotating Savings and Credit Associations 
(ROSCAs) 
 
Use of commercial banks and mobile money are largely urban phenomena, with 22 
percent of households in Kampala reporting using commercial banks and 20 percent 
using mobile money. This trend shows that having mobile account does not 
necessary translate into usage of mobile money services, which suggests that 
mobile money account per se is not a good indicator for financial inclusion. 
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  These findings are reinforced by the evidence in Table 15, where over 50 percent 
of the households reported having received money in cash form, and only 6.7 
percent through mobile money services. Much smaller number (4.8 percent) 
received money through the banking channel – making banks the least used channel 
for money transfer, remittances and payments.  
  
   
Table 15. Mechanism for receiving money by households in Uganda, 2016/17 
(percent) 
 Main source of Income Cash  In-Kind  Mobile money Bank Othera Total 
 Subsistence Farming 53.4 41.7  3.6 0.7 0.7 100.0 
 Wage Employment 56.6  21.9  5.6 15.3 0.6 100.0 
Non-Agricultural 
Enterprises  67.5 20.5   9.6 1.4 1.0 100.0 
Remittances 32.0  48.1   17.0 1.1 1.8 100.0 
 Other 68.3 13.3  12.8 5.2 0.4 100.0 
 Total - Uganda 56.3 31.4   6.7 4.8 0.8 100.0 
   
 
 
   
Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics 
aOther includes SACCO, Western Union, Money Gram, Other money transfers 
 
 
 
 
  
  
6 Conclusion and implication for policy  
 
Evidence suggests a weak link between financial deepening and financial usage by 
firms and households. The acclaimed achievement in financial inclusion that relies 
on the face value of financial and mobile money accounts and aggregate usage is 
exaggerated as evidence suggested that the actual gains are small. Measurement of 
financial inclusion need to go beyond mere account numbers to what is done with 
that account. There is also need for the subordination of financial inclusion policy to 
the needs of firms and households—the type that is modelled to fit the local context 
—if we are to achieve equitable financial inclusion. Despite vigorous official denials 
in government, the increased generosity in distributing cheap money (through 
SACCOs and community groups) across the country is at least partly motivated by 
strategic and political reasons, with implications for financial inclusion and the 
development of the financial sector. More consideration of behavioural constraints in 
financial inclusion programmes is required.  
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